

Online Appendix for “Sisters Are Doing it for Themselves: How Female Combatants Help Generate Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreements in Civil Wars”

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1 Gender Inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions

1.1 Examples of Provisions for Equality

General Equality

- “The right to equal protection of the law and against any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, belief, age, physical condition or civil status and against any incitement to such discrimination;” “Persons ... in all circumstances and treated humanely without any adverse discrimination founded on race, color, faith, sex, birth, social standing or any other similar criteria. (Philippines, *Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines*, 1998)
- “the guarantee of individual and collective fundamental liberties regardless of race, sex, religious denomination and language” (Algeria, *Plate-forme pour une solution politique et pacifique de la crise algérienne* (Plate-forme de Rome), 1995)
- “The Commission is given the charge ...to assure the respect for the provisions of this Constitution relative to multi-ethnicity and to gender;” (Burundi, ‘*Constitution of 18 March 2005*, 2005)

Social Equality

- “All Burundians are equal in [their] merits and dignity. All citizens enjoy the same rights and have right to the same protection of the law. No Burundian may be excluded from the social, economical or political life of the nation because of their race, of their language, of their religion, of their sex or of their ethnic origin.” (Burundi, ‘*Constitution of 18 March 2005*, 2005)
- “Men and women in the small-scale farmer, indigenous, black, Afro-descendent, raizal and palenquero communities, and other ethnic communities across Colombia’s territories are contributing to the structural transformation of the countryside and in particular to the closing of the agricultural frontier, in favour of a sustainable socio-environmental planning. To that end, it is necessary to recognise and to support the Peasant Enterprise Zones (Zonas de Reserva Campesina) and cooperative groups within society. (Colombia, *Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace*, 2016)
- “The Government undertakes to eliminate any form of de facto or de jure discrimination against women with regard to access to land, housing, credits and participation in development projects. The gender-based approach shall be incorporated into the policies, programmes and activities of the comprehensive development strategy.” (Guatemala, *Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups uprooted by the Armed Conflict*, 1994).

Specific Groups of Women

- “For the indigenous women and children of Chiapas, guarantee the right to health care, education and culture, nutrition, a dignified dwelling, basic services, and the right to participate in educational projects leading to a deserving integral development by allowing the contribution of indigenous women and designed for their particular needs.” (Mexico, *Actions and Measures for Chiapas Joint Commitments and Proposals from the State and Federal Governments, and the EZLN*, 1996)
- “a Darfur Herders and Nomads Development Council (DHND) shall be established under the DRA, with the strategic objective of... [addressing] the specific needs of nomad women and empower them including through nomadic education.” (Sudan, *Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan on the Basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*, 2013)
- “The facilities provided to the Dalit community according to this Article, shall have to be justly distributed to Dalit women and men and all the Dalit communities living in different parts of the country, ensuring that all Dalits receive the facilities proportionally” (Nepal, *Constitution of Nepal* 2015, 2015)
- “Establishment of special centers for rural women to develop their abilities.” (Yemen, *National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document*, 2014)

1.2 Examples of gender inclusive provisions for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegrations (DDR)

- “Eligible combatants will then be identified and registered in a database. They will receive a demobilization card. At this stage, women will be separated from men. Women shall have the same opportunities” Central African Republic, *Agreement between the Transitional Government and the armed groups on the principles of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and of integration into the uniformed State forces of the Central African Republic (DDRR Agreement)*, 2015
- “Planning of the cantonment shall take into consideration the desirable characteristics for a cantonment site, taking into account the specific needs of the M23’s female combatants” (Democratic Republic of Congo, *Outcome Documents from the Conclusion of the Kampala Dialogue between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the M23*), 2013
- “The DDR programme shall be gender sensitive and shall encourage the participation of the communities and the civil society organizations with the view to strengthening their capacities to play their role in improving and sustaining the social and economic reintegration of former combatants.” (Sudan, “Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (Naivasha Agreement),” 2005)
- “Adopt and implement, in an effective and sustainable way, national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes (DDR) and, where applicable, ensure regional coordination for repatriation and resettlement components (DDRRR), taking into account the special needs of former child soldiers and female ex-combatants” (“Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region,” 2004)
- “The Corps of Defense and of Security develop within them a nondiscriminatory, non-ethnicist and non-sexist culture.” (Burundi, “Constitution of 18 March 2005”, 2005)

1.3 Examples of gender inclusive provisions for Rehabilitation

- “The NTGL, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation.” (Liberia, Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement of Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Political Parties (Accra Agreement), 2003)
- “The Parties agree to adopt criteria for eligible financing schemes, such as, priority areas of capacity building, institutional strengthening, impact programs to address imbalances in development and infrastructures, and economic facilitation for return to normal life affecting combatant and non-combatant elements of the MILF, indigenous peoples, women, children, and internally displaced persons.” (Philippines, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2012)
- “Thee meeting will aim at mobilizing financial support for immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation action in three priority areas agreed by the parties.... Rehabilitating war-affected women and children...Providing livelihoods for war-affected people in the North and East” (Sri Lanka, “Significant Steps to Restore Normalcy, Improve Security and Address Political Matters”, 2002)

2 Disaggregating Equality Dependent Variable

2.1 Further exploring the relationships between female rebels and provisions for marginalized women

In this section, I further disaggregate the main response variable in an attempt to tease out the specific causal mechanisms. Here, I look more closely at the specific language of gender-inclusive peace terms to alleviate concerns that the categories developed by the PA-X are too broad to effectively test the relationships I posit in the manuscript. I disaggregate the equality measures to assess whether provisions actually address the marginalization of particular groups of women in society. To do this, I first restricted consideration to include only provisions in the PA-X

database that referenced particular and specific groups of women. The relevant group in society changes from case to case but, as I describe in the previous section, these provisions can refer to indigenous women from Chiapas, herder and nomadic women from Darfur, Dalit women from Nepal, among others. Next, I further restricted the data to include only the subset of provisions that also explicitly referenced the terms *discrimination*, *exclusion*, *marginalization/marginalized*, *minority* or *inclusion*. Therefore, these analyses considered only provisions that made specific references to marginalization, exclusion or discrimination against specific groups of women.

Second, I also recode the data to examine whether any gender-inclusive term references both the terms *discrimination* as well as call for the inclusion of women. This is also specific language that one might expect to see if female combatants advocated for women from marginalized or excluded backgrounds.

Third, I examine whether terms provide for increased support and development of women from under-developed areas. These provisions can call for the allocation of resources to women from underdeveloped regions, recognizing their historical political and economic exclusion. Here, I examine whether provisions call for gender inclusive provisions for any kind of development. I also disaggregate the results to separate development in the areas of health and education, respectively.

Table A.7, which displays the results of these aforementioned analyses, shows that female combatant prevalence has a significant impact on each of these types of agreement provisions. Female rebel participation bears the strongest influence, however, on gender-inclusive development provisions. Figure A.1, shows the first difference of female combatant prevalence on each of these dependent variables. These findings all support the interpretation of the main results in the manuscript.




Figure A.1: Expected change in probability of a gender-inclusive peace agreement provision mentioning discrimination, marginalization or development by female combatant prevalence, 95% confidence intervals

2.2 Disaggregating Equality measure

These results disaggregate one of the main response variables into those that look at equality for women general, those that specifically discuss equality for women across social groups and those that discuss equality as it pertains to women from specific identity groups.

Table A.1: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on gender inclusive Agreement Provisions- Recoding Marginalization**

	(1) Discrimination & Any Gender-Inclusive Provision	(2) Marginalization Specific Grps of Women	(3) Development: Any	(4) Development: Education	(5) Development: Health
Female Combat Prevalence	0.474*** (0.179)	1.024*** (0.378)	0.545*** (0.183)	0.457 (0.282)	0.638*** (0.224)
Constant	-3.494*** (0.290)	-6.698*** (1.002)	-3.604*** (0.341)	-4.496*** (0.520)	-4.757*** (0.404)
Observations	1288	1288	1288	1288	1288
bic	569.9	121.3	569.8	278.1	286.8
aic	559.6	111.0	559.5	267.8	276.4

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.2: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on Gender Inclusive Equality Provisions- Disaggregating Equality Measure**

	(1) Equality (All)	(2) Social Equality	(3) Equality: Specific Groups
Female Combat Prevalence	0.410* (0.210)	1.028*** (0.333)	0.387 (0.242)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.303** (0.118)	0.195 (0.210)	0.197 (0.131)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-2.848*** (0.998)	-3.583 (2.297)	-1.462 (1.484)
Women's INGOs	0.0224** (0.0110)	0.0295* (0.0172)	0.0301*** (0.0111)
UN Involvement	-0.408 (0.659)	0.587 (0.709)	-0.135 (0.650)
Major Power Involvement	0.206 (0.832)	-1.196 (0.969)	1.272** (0.580)
UN Women Office	-0.617 (0.800)	0.659 (1.292)	0.582 (0.942)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.663*** (0.534)	-2.217** (0.879)	-2.086*** (0.754)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.003* (0.530)	1.481** (0.632)	2.618*** (0.737)
Agreement Length	0.0385** (0.0169)	0.0521*** (0.0150)	0.0201** (0.0100)
Substantive Agreement	1.025*** (0.384)	1.721*** (0.493)	0.948** (0.424)
"Women's Civil Liberties	-0.198 (1.097)	2.077 (2.420)	1.591 (1.495)
Women Signatories	-0.744 (0.710)	0.221 (0.714)	-0.486 (0.428)
Equality Provision	1.657*** (0.413)	0.912* (0.545)	0.803* (0.467)
Constant	-3.771*** (0.850)	-7.582*** (1.937)	-6.499*** (1.146)
Observations	874	874	874
bic	342.6	224.7	299.2
aic	271.0	153.1	227.6

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3 Disaggregating Gender Inclusive Provisions for Inclusion & Reintegration

The analyses in the manuscript aggregate provisions in the PAX dataset to code the main dependent variables. In particular, I collapse provisions for the inclusion of historically marginalized groups of women and those calling for general equality across groups of women together. I also aggregate DDR and rehabilitation provisions into a single variable. While these decisions were made because of the infrequency of these provisions in the data, and therefore minimal statistical power, the following results demonstrate the main patterns hold.

Table A.3: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on gender inclusive Reintegration and Rehabilitation Provisions- Disaggregating Reintegration Measure**

	(1)	(2)
	Gender-Inclusive DDR	Gender-Inclusive Rehab. Provision
Female Combat Prevalence	0.854*** (0.274)	0.681*** (0.187)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	-0.491 (0.301)	-1.559 (1.198)
Women's Civil Society Participation	2.012 (4.554)	-3.074*** (1.133)
Women's INGOs	0.00864 (0.0122)	0.0441*** (0.0146)
UN Involvement	0.778 (0.744)	-0.208 (0.461)
Major Power Involvement	2.081*** (0.607)	0.900 (0.989)
UN Women Office	-0.368 (0.768)	-0.588 (0.899)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.731 (0.606)	-1.024* (0.546)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.525 (0.861)	-0.283 (0.684)
Agreement Length	0.0383** (0.0162)	0.0225*** (0.00752)
v2x_gencl_lag2	-1.624 (3.838)	-1.027 (1.459)
Women Signatories	0 (.)	0.0275 (0.755)
DDR provision	2.282*** (0.828)	1.155*** (0.439)
Substantive Agreement	-0.330 (0.605)	1.495*** (0.449)
Constant	-8.095*** (1.373)	-5.588*** (0.869)
Observations	853	874
bic	204.7	211.4
aic	138.2	139.8

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

4 Outliers

4.1 Removing Nepal and Colombia

In this section, I demonstrate the project generalizes beyond Nepal and Colombia, given the significant qualitative evidence gleaned from these two cases. After dropping these potentially influential observations, the results remain consistent.

Table A.4: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on gender inclusive Agreement Provisions- Excluding Agreements from Colombia and Nepal**

	(1) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(2) Women's Equality
Female Combat Prevalence	1.103*** (0.277)	0.618** (0.245)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	-1.030** (0.447)	0.234** (0.0946)
Women's Civil Society Participation	3.434 (4.927)	-0.935 (1.087)
Women's INGOs	0.0108 (0.00744)	0.0173** (0.00797)
UN Involvement	-0.327 (0.467)	-0.538 (0.503)
Major Power Involvement	1.338*** (0.507)	0.236 (0.573)
UN Women Office	-1.273 (0.959)	-0.794 (1.031)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.373 (0.524)	-1.232*** (0.456)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.222** (0.494)	1.964*** (0.454)
Agreement Length	0.0315 (0.0214)	0.0439** (0.0193)
Substantive Agreement	0.779** (0.315)	0.580 (0.480)
v2x_gencl_lag2	-1.154 (3.101)	0.965 (1.052)
Women Signatories	-1.226 (1.119)	-1.110* (0.638)
DDR provision	1.726*** (0.409)	
Equality Provision		1.515*** (0.448)
Constant	-8.517*** (2.370)	-5.143*** (0.922)
Observations	730	730
bic	243.0	357.3
aic	174.1	288.4

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

5 Sample of UCDP peace agreements agreements only

In the main analysis, I utilize Bell and Badanjak's (2019) PA-X database because it is the most comprehensive source of peace agreements. These data contain the largest number of peace agreements and includes more detail on the specific terms written into agreements. The PA-X dataset includes over 1600 agreements between 1990 and 2019, with more 1000 corresponding to intrastate conflicts. According to Bell and Badanjak (2019), a peace agreement is defined as a "formal, publicly-available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to end it." Although this definition may be considered broad, it is consistent with the definitions employed in other datasets. For instance, according to UCDP Peace Agreement dataset, a "peace agreement is a formal agreement between at least two opposing primary warring parties, which addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility." This definition does not differ significantly from that used by Bell and Badanjak (2019).

Below I include a robustness check to ensure that the results presented in the manuscript are not driven by PA-X's unique operationalization of peace agreements. I use UCDP peace agreement's universe of cases matched with PA-X's gender variables. I do not rely solely on UCDP's peace agreement dataset because it only codes whether agreements include provisions for *gender inclusion* but does not code the substance of these provisions nor does it disaggregate these peace terms beyond a gender binary. Even when the sample is restricted to agreements included in PA-X's dataset, the main results remain consistent. UN Women variable dropped from models due to collinearity.

Table A.5: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on gender inclusive Agreement Provisions- Only Including Agreements in UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset**

	(1) Women's Equality	(2) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	1.647*** (0.623)	3.286*** (0.737)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	-0.0297 (0.541)	-5.340*** (1.721)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-13.51*** (4.921)	-0.0857 (7.625)
Women's INGOs	0.148*** (0.0465)	0.218*** (0.0506)
UN Involvement	0.0716 (0.807)	-0.431 (0.877)
Major Power Involvement	-2.069*** (0.726)	3.393* (1.916)
UN Women Office		
Religious Rebel Ideology	-2.745*** (0.796)	-2.649** (1.234)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	4.176*** (1.179)	2.066** (0.874)
Agreement Length	0.151*** (0.0429)	0.168*** (0.0226)
Substantive Agreement	0.585 (0.576)	-0.476 (0.728)
Women's Civil Liberties	7.844** (3.066)	-3.997 (4.263)
Women Signatories	-4.220*** (0.899)	-5.925*** (1.587)
Equality Provision	1.609* (0.967)	
DDR provision		1.844* (0.946)
Constant	-10.11*** (2.253)	-18.55*** (3.583)
Observations	131	131
bic	124.0	101.1
aic	83.72	60.84

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

6 Robustness checks examining results on Substantive agreements only

6.1 Substantive Agreements Only

The following models replicate the main results restricting the samples to PA-X agreements that are considered substantive in nature. Substantive agreements are those attempting to address the substance of the incompatibility between belligerents. These agreements can be juxtaposed with those hoping to garner agreement on the framework or process of the negotiation process, those to establish ceasefires, and those hoping to renew, implement or renegotiate an existing agreement. This category includes both partial and comprehensive agreements. The substantive interpretation of the results remain consistent when the data is subsetting in this way.

Table A.6: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on gender inclusive Agreement Provisions- Substantive Agreements Only**

	(1) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(2) Women's Equality
Female Combat Prevalence	0.753*** (0.194)	0.458** (0.229)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	-1.285* (0.775)	0.282* (0.169)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-1.710 (3.639)	-1.361 (1.173)
Women's INGOs	0.0419* (0.0215)	0.0252* (0.0141)
UN Involvement	-0.0492 (0.803)	-0.136 (0.632)
Major Power Involvement	1.076 (1.059)	0.404 (0.701)
UN Women Office	-1.315 (1.130)	-0.0331 (1.063)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.914 (0.641)	-1.805*** (0.612)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.340 (0.698)	1.615*** (0.540)
Agreement Length	0.0354** (0.0167)	0.0362** (0.0152)
Women's Civil Liberties	-0.952 (3.250)	0.949 (1.468)
Women Signatories	-1.103 (0.893)	-1.255 (0.808)
DDR provision	1.385* (0.724)	
Equality Provision		1.169*** (0.420)
Constant	-4.951*** (1.446)	-3.995*** (1.103)
Observations	231	231
bic	165.6	230.7
aic	117.4	182.5

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

7 Scope Conditions- Ethnic Conflicts

It is possible that the main argument does not apply to all types of conflicts or may be stronger in certain types of civil conflicts. Particularly, since the argument rests on the existence of cleavages between historically marginalized people that become rebel recruits and the state, the argument may be most relevant in ethnic conflicts. This section

examines whether there are scope conditions on the argument. In particular, I examine whether conflicts involving groups that are founded by a specific ethnic groups (FORGE; Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020)¹ are more likely to make claims on behalf of marginalized groups. The data are subset to include ethnic foundations and no ethnic foundations. The results here suggest that conflicts fought by groups with ethnic foundations are more likely to see gender inclusive provisions for women’s equality.

Table A.7: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on Gender Inclusive Equality Provisions- Ethnic Dimensions**

	(1) Ethnic Foundations Women’s Equality	(2) No Ethnic Foundations Women’s Equality
Female Combat Prevalence	0.754*** (0.288)	0.390 (0.556)
Number of Anti-state Women’s Protests	0.126 (0.0984)	0.559*** (0.210)
Women’s Civil Society Participation	0.560 (1.244)	-3.319 (2.801)
Women’s INGOs	0.0159 (0.0101)	0.0210 (0.0143)
UN Involvement	-0.560 (0.530)	-0.580 (1.147)
Major Power Involvement	0.322 (0.623)	-1.485 (2.411)
UN Women Office	-1.946** (0.771)	-0.372 (1.055)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.390** (0.563)	-1.781 (1.100)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	2.375*** (0.545)	0.808 (1.140)
Agreement Length	0.0345* (0.0183)	0.0894*** (0.0279)
Substantive Agreement	0.984* (0.547)	0.843* (0.483)
Women’s Civil Liberties	1.147 (1.356)	0.199 (2.371)
Women Signatories	-1.414 (1.159)	-0.966 (0.727)
Equality Provision	1.766*** (0.556)	1.320** (0.527)
Constant	-6.488*** (0.875)	-3.517 (2.386)
Observations	593	281
bic	279.1	195.7
aic	213.3	141.1

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

8 International Influence

8.1 UN1325, Beijing

The following analyses employ alternative measures to capture changing norms on the WPS agenda or international obligations regarding the inclusion of women in conflict resolution and peace building process. The Beijing Declaration is widely accepted as a watershed moment in the creation of a global agenda on women’s rights, equality and inclusion. This variable controls for whether agreements were signed after the declaration was signed in 1995. Alternatively, many scholars view UN Security Resolution 1325 as the main document creating and establishing legal obligations for states to include women and consider the role of gender in peace processes. Any agreements signed after October 2000, when the UNSC resolution passed, are coded 1; agreements signed before this time are coded 0. Even after controlling for these alternative ways to capture international pressure, the results remain consistent. Whether the agreement was signed after the Beijing declaration has no bearing on these particular gender-inclusive peace agreement terms. UN 1325 only makes provisions for gender inclusive DDR more likely. The resolution has no effect on terms for equality for groups of women.

¹Braithwaite, Jessica Maves and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2020. "When Organizations Rebel: Introducing the Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset." *International Studies Quarterly* 64(1):183-193.

Table A.8: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatant Prevalence on Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions—Controlling for UNSC 1325 and Beijing Declaration Era Agreements**

	(1) Equality	(2) Equality	(3) DDR/Rehab	(4) DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.343** (0.161)	0.340** (0.159)	0.927*** (0.223)	0.894*** (0.209)
Num. of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.282*** (0.106)	0.254** (0.107)	-0.519* (0.276)	-0.642** (0.252)
Women's Civil Society Part.	-1.992** (0.930)	-2.054** (0.912)	0.818 (2.769)	-0.0174 (3.048)
Women's INGOs	0.0229*** (0.00876)	0.0240*** (0.00838)	0.00811 (0.0110)	0.0168 (0.0107)
UN Involvement	-0.391 (0.583)	-0.420 (0.586)	0.255 (0.408)	0.171 (0.443)
Major Power Involvement	0.609 (0.490)	0.637 (0.510)	1.684*** (0.540)	1.735*** (0.633)
Post UN 1325	0.266 (0.339)		1.256* (0.657)	
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.684*** (0.503)	-1.649*** (0.494)	-0.810* (0.433)	-0.857* (0.456)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.476*** (0.481)	1.436*** (0.465)	0.0311 (0.569)	0.0908 (0.636)
Agreement Length	0.0432** (0.0186)	0.0433** (0.0191)	0.0332** (0.0142)	0.0319* (0.0171)
Substantive Agreement	0.827** (0.372)	0.824** (0.380)	0.598** (0.246)	0.587** (0.251)
Women's Civil Liberties	0.507 (1.002)	0.384 (1.009)	-0.836 (2.277)	-0.798 (2.354)
Women Signatories	-0.985 (0.702)	-1.064 (0.733)	-1.188 (0.891)	-1.309 (0.972)
Equality Provision	1.295*** (0.376)	1.268*** (0.384)		
Post Beijing		0.133 (0.507)		0.553 (0.774)
DDR provision			1.635*** (0.329)	1.642*** (0.298)
Constant	-4.238*** (0.869)	-4.100*** (0.823)	-7.295*** (1.455)	-6.651*** (1.486)
Observations	874	874	874	874
bic	424.4	424.8	287.7	293.1
aic	352.8	353.3	216.1	221.5

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

8.2 Examining the Effect of Official Development Aid

The following results offer alternative ways that the international community may pressure states to adopt gender reforms. In particular, I control for foreign aid conditionality in two ways. First, I include the total amount of “Aid activities targeting gender equality and women empowerment” from OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, which encompassing contributions from the largest global providers of aid. These data capture whether states receive funds earmarked for women’s empowerment and can assess whether donor’s are encouraging states to advance women’s rights. These data are only available between 2002 and 2019, so all observations prior to 2002 are coded missing. Second, I include data on “Net Official Development Assistance Received” from OECD’s DAC, a standard measure of international aid. These data capture all development aid received by governments without respect to the specific purpose it is earmarked for. Importantly, the addition of these controls to the models does not impact the substance of the results.

Table A.9: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatant Prevalence on Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions–Official Development Aid**

	(1) Women’s Equality	(2) Women’s Equality	(3) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(4) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.360** (0.167)	0.531* (0.316)	0.828*** (0.194)	2.037*** (0.495)
Official Development Aid Earmarked for Women’s Empowerment		0.00226*** (0.000773)		0.0000231 (0.000192)
Official Development Aid	1.33e-09*** (3.40e-10)		7.92e-10** (3.43e-10)	
Number of Anti-state Women’s Protests	0.358*** (0.111)	0.717 (0.464)	-0.714** (0.280)	-0.607 (0.739)
Women’s Civil Society Participation	-1.727* (0.920)	-0.234 (3.213)	0.119 (2.871)	4.410*** (1.602)
Women’s INGOs	0.0235*** (0.00879)	-0.00570 (0.0204)	0.0237*** (0.00920)	0.0259 (0.0172)
UN Involvement	-0.574 (0.524)	0.173 (1.006)	-0.0242 (0.474)	0.604 (0.745)
Major Power Involvement	0.0497 (0.591)	0.568 (1.299)	1.545*** (0.485)	2.471*** (0.899)
UN Women Office	-0.806 (0.941)	-1.424 (1.556)	-1.331 (0.820)	-4.175*** (1.000)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.465*** (0.478)	-1.271* (0.706)	-0.808 (0.530)	0.490 (0.928)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.020** (0.491)	-0.641 (1.068)	-0.147 (0.654)	-1.076 (1.184)
Agreement Length	0.0474** (0.0194)	0.122*** (0.0406)	0.0343* (0.0176)	0.0949*** (0.0188)
Substantive Agreement	0.840** (0.351)	1.265** (0.519)	0.549** (0.255)	0.148 (0.385)
Women’s Civil Liberties	-0.0713 (0.855)	2.126 (3.214)	-1.575 (2.350)	-4.815** (2.272)
Women Signatories	-0.744 (0.603)	-14.68*** (4.005)	-1.300 (1.012)	-2.065*** (0.774)
Equality Provision	1.381*** (0.366)	1.725*** (0.634)		
DDR provision			1.732*** (0.299)	1.426*** (0.366)
Constant	-4.474*** (0.717)	-6.786*** (1.470)	-6.259*** (1.084)	-9.913*** (1.799)
Observations	874	305	874	305
bic	406.6	197.6	289.0	178.3
aic	335.0	138.1	217.4	118.8

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

9 Replications Including Measures of Gender Equality

9.1 Replications Including Measures of Gender Equality

Table A.10: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatant Prevalence on Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions- Measures of Gender Equality**

	(1) Equality	(2) Equality	(3) Equality
Female Combat Prevalence	0.293 (0.211)	0.394** (0.176)	0.306* (0.181)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.209* (0.109)	0.193* (0.108)	0.231** (0.108)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-1.437 (2.062)	-2.482*** (0.922)	-1.922** (0.887)
Women's INGOs	0.0323*** (0.0106)	0.0255*** (0.00813)	0.0256*** (0.00852)
UN Involvement	-0.431 (0.722)	-0.368 (0.578)	-0.423 (0.587)
Major Power Involvement	0.915* (0.512)	0.729 (0.528)	0.691 (0.517)
UN Women Office	-0.960 (1.064)	-1.124 (0.832)	-0.962 (0.935)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.856*** (0.624)	-1.615*** (0.502)	-1.663*** (0.513)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.665*** (0.592)	1.581*** (0.484)	1.431*** (0.469)
Agreement Length	0.0635*** (0.0223)	0.0447** (0.0209)	0.0445** (0.0202)
Substantive Agreement	0.636* (0.362)	0.835** (0.363)	0.821** (0.375)
Women's Civil Liberties	0.886 (1.798)	0.190 (1.053)	0.308 (0.993)
Women Signatories	-1.746* (0.909)	-1.106 (0.708)	-1.110 (0.710)
Equality Provision	1.394*** (0.426)	1.249*** (0.389)	1.291*** (0.396)
Women Political Empowerment Index (start year)	-2.274 (4.464)		
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)		-0.00820 (0.00744)	
Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%) (modeled ILO estimat			-0.00382 (0.0101)
Constant	-3.596*** (1.095)	-3.119*** (1.184)	-3.767*** (0.975)
Observations	803	871	871
bic	392.0	428.2	430.4
aic	317.0	351.9	354.0

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.11: Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatant Prevalence on Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions- Measures of Gender Equality

	(1) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(2) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(3) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.647** (0.277)	0.780*** (0.187)	0.986*** (0.230)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	-0.903** (0.415)	-0.696*** (0.266)	-0.681*** (0.256)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-4.978* (2.758)	-0.317 (2.976)	-1.977 (2.363)
Women's INGOs	0.0147 (0.0125)	0.0285*** (0.0109)	0.0289*** (0.0110)
UN Involvement	-0.157 (0.540)	0.105 (0.435)	0.0244 (0.469)
Major Power Involvement	1.603*** (0.543)	1.757*** (0.530)	1.700*** (0.553)
UN Women Office	-3.111*** (1.108)	-1.373* (0.802)	-1.153 (0.775)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.960** (0.489)	-0.943* (0.526)	-0.720 (0.542)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.682 (0.563)	0.101 (0.619)	0.160 (0.598)
Agreement Length	0.0466* (0.0257)	0.0337** (0.0166)	0.0327** (0.0134)
Substantive Agreement	0.580** (0.295)	0.558** (0.241)	0.578** (0.273)
Women's Civil Liberties	-10.00*** (3.566)	-0.969 (2.443)	-0.324 (1.970)
Women Signatories	-2.336** (1.169)	-1.398 (0.982)	-1.356 (0.892)
DDR provision	2.120*** (0.296)	1.619*** (0.303)	1.527*** (0.360)
Women Political Empowerment Index	19.33*** (6.644)		
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)		0.00370 (0.00981)	
Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%) (modeled ILO estimat			0.0199 (0.0178)
Constant	-10.15*** (1.819)	-6.440*** (1.693)	-7.151*** (1.520)
Observations	803	871	871
bic	257.9	298.7	296.7
aic	182.9	222.4	220.4

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

9.2 Replications Including Women in Parliament

I conduct a regressions to demonstrate whether controlling for women's participation in parliament influences the integration of gender-inclusive peace agreement provisions for equality and DDR. I use data on the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments since 1990 from World Bank World Development Indicators. Given the large amount of missing data, these analyses have very few observations. Data are missing on 83% of the cases. Even with extensive missing data, the main results remain.

Table A.12: Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on Gender inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions– including measure controlling for women in parliament

	Women's Equality	Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.384** (0.181)	0.687*** (0.168)
Prop of lower chamber parliament seats held By Women	0.0337 (0.0311)	0.0428 (0.0421)
Constant	-3.718*** (0.526)	-4.713*** (0.711)
Observations	782	782
bic	398.2	318.8
aic	384.3	304.8

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

10 Alternate Measurements of Female Combatants

10.1 Low Prevalence Only

As noted in the manuscript, it is possible that DDR provisions are only more likely to be incorporated into agreements when there exist women to be demobilized. That is, there may be an association between DDR and female combatants simply because women are present and engaged in combat, not because of their advocacy efforts. To examine this possibility, I recode the female combatant data to measure only whether there are “low” rates of women’s participation (less than 5% of the organization’s fighters are women). The reference category here includes no women’s participation in combat, as well as “moderate” and “high” women’s participation in combat. If it were merely the presence of women that promoted DDR provisions, even minimal women’s participation would encourage such peace terms. On the other hand, if only the saturation of women within a group encourages attention to rebel female’s demands, low female participation would do little to encourage such provisions. Table A.13 examines these two possibilities.

Model 1 in Table A.13 shows low rates of female participation is negatively associated with gender inclusive DDR and rehabilitation provisions. These results offer support for the interpretation that only when women are able to pressure their organizations through a critical mass are we likely to see gender inclusive DDR provisions. Thus, it is not simply the fact that there are any female combatants that causes belligerents to offer accommodations for female combatants. Only relative to no women’s participation, is low female participation in combat associated with an increased probability of a gender inclusive DDR/rehabilitation provision.

Table A.13: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatant Prevalence on Gender-Inclusive Peace Agreement Provisions**

	(1) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(2) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Low Female Combatant Prevalence	-1.239** (0.623)	15.24*** (0.941)
High or Moderate Female Combatant Prevalence		16.90*** (0.959)
Number of Anti-state Women’s Protests	-0.755*** (0.238)	-0.658** (0.273)
Women’s Civil Society Participation	-0.111 (2.643)	-0.689 (2.228)
Women’s INGOs	0.0319*** (0.00979)	0.0171* (0.0100)
UN Involvement	-0.0409 (0.458)	0.0708 (0.444)
Major Power Involvement	1.536** (0.628)	1.729*** (0.621)
UN Women Office	-1.760** (0.802)	-1.469 (0.937)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.681 (0.445)	-0.767 (0.521)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.173 (0.590)	-0.0504 (0.599)
Agreement Length	0.0327** (0.0154)	0.0317* (0.0192)
Substantive Agreement	0.595** (0.259)	0.670*** (0.224)
Women’s Civil Liberties	-1.806 (2.225)	0.130 (1.963)
Women Signatories	-1.330 (0.971)	-1.119 (0.952)
DDR provision	1.687*** (0.294)	1.683*** (0.299)
Constant	-4.262*** (0.952)	-20.81*** (1.219)
Observations	874	874
bic	299.6	290.5
aic	228.0	214.2

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

10.2 Female Rebel Leadership Roles

It is possible that women leaders are be more important than female combatants in determining the outcome of peace agreements. While I believe this argument is intuitive, it may not be correct. Women’s leadership is another potential means of leverage, but previous literature has found that women leaders– especially where they are few– do not necessarily have different priorities and behaviors than male rebel leaders (Herrera 2010). Likewise (Caprioli 2000) and (Mcglan and Sarkees 1998) find that female state leaders and foreign policy elites exhibit similar conflict behaviors as their male counterparts due to selection; women that move up the leadership chain do so because they have similar interests and attitudes as men. Additionally, in some organizations, women occupy leadership roles but do not participate in combat (e.g., **Sudan’s National Democratic Alliance**). In these data, female leaders are more common when women are absent from combat roles or when they serve in these roles infrequently. Moreover, since the main mechanism works through female rebels’ collective action, it is important to capture whether female constitute a collective. Women’s leadership roles cannot capture this dynamic.

Below, I examine this empirically. After controlling for whether women serve in leadership roles (?), the main results remain significant. However, female rebel leaders do not appear to exert a significant effect on women-specific provisions for equality and they decrease the chances of seeing a gender-sensitive term for reintegration and rehabilitation. Future work should unpack the relationship between female leadership and participation in rebellion.

Table A.14: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on Gender Inclusive Agreement Provisions- including female rebel leadership controls**

	(1) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab	(2) Women's Equality
Female Combat Prevalence	0.494* (0.269)	2.241*** (0.612)
Female Rebel Leaders (low threshold)	-0.670 (0.423)	-2.887** (1.166)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.164 (0.129)	-0.635 (0.402)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-1.799* (0.952)	-5.269** (2.099)
Women's INGOs	0.0128 (0.00959)	0.0398* (0.0209)
UN Involvement	0.0138 (0.637)	-0.251 (0.527)
Major Power Involvement	0.924* (0.504)	1.237* (0.656)
UN Women Office	-0.892 (0.720)	-1.034 (1.120)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.326*** (0.463)	-1.021* (0.590)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	0.775** (0.394)	0.107 (0.628)
Agreement Length	0.0268** (0.0132)	0.0410** (0.0181)
Substantive Agreement	0.940** (0.438)	1.075*** (0.378)
Women's Civil Liberties	1.253 (1.046)	1.033 (2.533)
Women Signatories	0 (.)	-0.754 (0.552)
Equality Provision	1.142*** (0.406)	
DDR provision		2.194*** (0.341)
Constant	-3.645*** (0.815)	-6.183*** (1.204)
Observations	599	601
bic	340.7	219.2
aic	274.8	153.2

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

11 Controlling for Multiple Agreements

In this section, I explore the effect that dependencies in the data have on the results in a number of ways. Some conflicts, particularly those that last a long time may see a large number of agreements. Colombia, for example saw 126 agreements between 1990 and 2017. Most conflicts see far fewer agreements; the average number of agreements in a conflict in these data is 12.6. In Table A.4, I replicate the main findings and show that dropping Colombia has no impact on the substantive interpretation of the results.

The broader concern with including multiple agreements is that the number of agreement attempts may be related to the probability of an agreement including gender-inclusive provisions. That is, the more agreements that are signed in a conflict, the greater probability that any one of those agreements will include at least one provision addressing female combatants' interests. One option to address this concern is to conduct the statistical analyses on only a subset of these agreements. In Table A.6, I include only substantive agreements, which are agreements that deal with the broader political issues that undergird the conflict. The results remain consistent when the data are subset in this way.

An alternative approach would be to include only the first or last agreement signed in the process. This is problematic, however, because some peace processes negotiate the key issues in the conflict separately, which generates different agreements governing different substantive issues. Including only the first or last agreement would exclude any agreements that were signed in between that dealt with the social and political issues that might concern equality or combatant needs. For instance, in the Guatemalan peace process, 18 agreements were signed between 1990 and 1996. This included one agreement on indigenous rights, which was signed in March 1995 and one agreement on the integration of the URNG, which was signed in December 1996. Neither of these agreements were the first or last to be signed in this conflict, which means these relevant agreements and their provisions would be excluded from the analyses. Additionally, including only a single agreement from a conflict would yield too few observations (77) to gain any analytical leverage over the question at hand.

To address this issue without excluding relevant agreements, I include variables that account for the total number of agreements that are ultimately signed within a conflict in Table A.15. In Table A.16, I sort the agreements within a conflict by date and create a running total of agreements up until the point that a given agreement is signed. Therefore, if three total agreements were signed— one per year in 2000, 2001 and 2002— the running total would record 1 agreement in 2000, 2 agreements in 2001 and 3 agreements in 2002.

I also control for dependencies in the data by clustering the standard errors on the conflict instead of the country, as was done in the main analyses. These results can be found in Table A.17. The results remain robust to these specification changes.

Table A.15: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on Gender Inclusive Agreement Provisions- controlling for total number of agreements**

	(1) Women's Equality	(2) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.494** (0.200)	0.967*** (0.245)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.222** (0.0985)	-0.828*** (0.283)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-1.035 (0.925)	0.549 (2.870)
Women's INGOs	0.0224*** (0.00818)	0.0254*** (0.00936)
UN Involvement	-0.578 (0.537)	-0.198 (0.478)
Major Power Involvement	0.385 (0.546)	1.598*** (0.485)
UN Women Office	-0.834 (0.939)	-1.300 (0.870)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.063** (0.431)	-0.459 (0.645)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.478*** (0.428)	0.494 (0.619)
Agreement Length	0.0432*** (0.0167)	0.0350** (0.0169)
Substantive Agreement	0.782** (0.374)	0.585*** (0.223)
Women's Civil Liberties	-0.0835 (0.936)	-1.354 (2.079)
Women Signatories	-1.152* (0.617)	-1.580 (1.007)
Equality Provision	1.342*** (0.367)	
num_agt	-0.0137** (0.00633)	-0.0165 (0.0107)
DDR provision		1.650*** (0.315)
Constant	-4.112*** (0.644)	-6.205*** (0.992)
Observations	874	874
bic	425.5	294.4
aic	349.2	218.0

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; Fixed effects not shown; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.16: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on gender inclusive Agreement Provisions- Controlling for running total agreements**

	(1) Women's Equality	(2) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.784*** (0.226)	1.155*** (0.251)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.234** (0.0981)	-1.355** (0.621)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-0.0549 (1.026)	1.390 (3.175)
Women's INGOs	0.0161* (0.00853)	0.0248** (0.0101)
UN Involvement	-0.762 (0.466)	-0.625* (0.369)
Major Power Involvement	0.0328 (0.726)	1.446** (0.563)
UN Women Office	-0.721 (1.119)	-1.972* (1.073)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-0.575 (0.496)	-0.228 (0.685)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.853*** (0.517)	0.996 (0.662)
Agreement Length	0.0355** (0.0164)	0.0289** (0.0137)
Substantive Agreement	0.536 (0.435)	0.471* (0.251)
Women's Civil Liberties	-0.139 (0.982)	-1.799 (2.149)
Women Signatories	-1.303* (0.737)	-2.066* (1.130)
Equality Provision	1.325*** (0.409)	
Running Number of Agreements	-0.126*** (0.0187)	-0.119*** (0.0323)
DDR provision		1.774*** (0.370)
Constant	-3.950*** (0.685)	-5.968*** (1.204)
Observations	874	874
bic	372.8	265.3
aic	296.5	188.9

Note: Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; Fixed effects not shown; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

12 Alternative Clustering

Table A.17: **Logistic Regression Analyses Examining the Effect of Female Combatants on Gender Inclusive Agreement Provisions- standard errors clustered on conflict**

	(1) Women's Equality	(2) Gender-Inclusive DDR/Rehab
Female Combat Prevalence	0.330** (0.158)	0.872*** (0.188)
Number of Anti-state Women's Protests	0.240** (0.102)	-0.756** (0.316)
Women's Civil Society Participation	-2.111** (0.830)	-0.556 (2.877)
Women's INGOs	0.0260*** (0.00783)	0.0155 (0.0109)
UN Involvement	-0.427 (0.577)	0.364 (0.577)
Major Power Involvement	0.652 (0.508)	1.901** (0.812)
UN Women Office	-0.925 (0.882)	-1.070 (0.751)
Religious Rebel Ideology	-1.641*** (0.493)	-0.630 (0.538)
Leftist Rebel Ideology	1.425*** (0.461)	0.188 (0.654)
Agreement Length	0.0434** (0.0192)	0.0355* (0.0205)
Substantive Agreement	0.830** (0.340)	0.744** (0.306)
Women's Civil Liberties	0.340 (0.970)	-0.637 (2.684)
Women Signatories	-1.091 (0.711)	-1.367 (1.060)
Equality Provision	1.282*** (0.394)	0.199 (0.323)
Constant	-3.962*** (0.757)	-5.290*** (0.936)
Observations	874	874
bic	423.8	305.7
aic	352.2	234.1

Note: Standard errors clustered on conflict in parentheses; Fixed effects not shown; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

References

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