


APPENDIX: Relational State Building in Areas of Limited
Statehood: Experimental Evidence on Attitudes about the Police

November 11, 2019

1 SELECTED VILLAGES

Table 1: List of Selected Villages in Grand Kru County

Villages
Behwan City
Behwan-B
Garaway-A
Garaway-B
Tuaken
Blebo B
Gbanken
Barclayville 1
Picnicess City
Gennoyah
Barforwin
Weteken
Newaken
Doeswan
Wilsonville



(a) Map of Grand Kru County Treated and Control Villages.

1.1 VILLAGE LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS


According to the 2008 census, there were forty-three villages, which included eighty households or more. From these I randomly chose fifteen for the study. Eighty households was the threshold because neighborhoods needed to be far enough a part so that not everyone in the village would know about the police visits. Importantly, the selected and not selected villages balance on a number of key factors such as the number of women and men in each village, experience with civil war, experience with government and rebel violence, distance to the capital, and distance to the nearest police depot, making the villages chosen for the experiment representative of the county. There were approximately 96 households in the villages selected and on average 110 households in the villages not selected, which is a statistically insignificant difference. The average number of males in the selected villages was 336 and the average number of males in the villages that were not selected was 371, which is a statistically insignificant difference. The average number of women in the selected villages was 320 and the average number of females in the villages not selected was 350, which is a statistically insignificant difference. In order to supplement this information from the census, my research assistants collected data on each village including whether or not the village experienced violence during the civil war and who perpetrated the violence. All villages reported experienced violence during the civil war. On averages, 40% of the villages in the selected group had experienced violence by the government and 52% of the villages not selected for the experiment

had experienced violence by the government (statistically insignificant). About 67% of the villages in the selected villages experienced rebel violence, whereas 63% of those not selected for the study experienced rebel violence (statistically insignificant). Additionally, the research assistant collected data on how far the villages were to the capital city of the county. On average the selected villages and villages that were not selected were both about 130 minutes away by motorbike or car from the capital. Finally, the research assistant also coded information about the distance from the village to the nearest police depot. On average, the nearest police depot among those villages selected was 47 minutes by vehicle or motor bike, whereas the average distance to an LNP depot was 61 minutes by vehicle or motor bike for villages not selected by the study.

2 OUTCOME QUESTIONS' CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

Figure 1: Correlation Coefficients

(a) Correlation coefficients for questions related to perceptions of effectiveness.



(b) Correlation coefficients for questions related to perceptions of abuse.





Figure 2: Correlation Coefficients

(a) Correlation coefficients for questions related to perceptions of abuse and effectiveness



3 COMPARISON TO PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN

The pre-analysis plan (registered under EGAP 20151128AA) pre-specified a series of hypotheses, research design, and outcome variables. Below, I evaluate deviations from the pre-analysis plan. Please note that this pre-analysis plan was written for a dissertation project.

The research design (Table 1 on page 10) was changed based on what was feasible on the ground. The following list the hypotheses from the pre-analysis plan as well as whether and how they were tested in the paper.

- Hypothesis 1 (page 4): Tested by H1 in paper
- Hypothesis 2 (page 4): Not tested because paper did not require test and because non-experimental
- Hypothesis 1a (page 5): Tested by H1 in paper
- Hypothesis 1b (page 5): Tested by H2 in paper (note that this hypothesis is tested among male and female respondents)
- Hypothesis 2a (page 5): Tested by H1 in paper
- Hypothesis 2b (page 5): Tested by H2 in paper note that this hypothesis is tested among male and female respondents)
- Hypothesis 3 (page 5): Not tested because paper did not require test and because non-experimental

The next section of the Pre-Analysis Plan lists heterogeneous effects. I did not include results related to previous experiences with violence because reporting these could have been endogenous to the treatment. I did test the heterogeneous effects by male and female respondents. Hypotheses 1a-1f and H2a-H2d on pages 7–8 are tested by H2.

Most of the outcome variables that were specified in the pre-analysis plan on pages 13–14 were the same variables that were used in the paper (with the same groupings). The only changes for “effectiveness” were that “It is easy to get help from the LNP?” question was not included in

effectiveness nor restraint (thought was significant in the right direction). This is because it was not clear from on the ground discussions whether this question actually measured effectiveness. Moreover, the “The LNP sometimes behave like criminals.” was added under the restraint section because this was a typo in the original pre-analysis plan. There were some changes in the “restraint” concept measurement. I did not include the following questions: “If the LNP comes to your village, the LNP will beat community members;” “The LNP can sometimes do man woman business with women in the community even if the woman does not agree;” “The LNP treat women unfairly,” and instead included “The LNP discriminate based on religion/ethnicity/tribe,” and “The LNP are corrupt and eating money.” The reason for this change was that the first three questions did not pretest well. That is, they yielded little variation in responses as well as a higher rate of non-response. The corruption questions and discrimination questions yielded higher a much higher level of variation. Additionally, with two out of the five question related to gender, the concept of restraint would not have been measured accurately. Nevertheless, if the original questions are included, this does not change the results of the study.

The two scenarios listed to test the outcome of security response are the same as in the pre-analysis plan (see page 15 of pre-analysis plan).

The characteristics in the balance test were used except for membership in secret society (not relevant in the county chosen), participation in armed group and the past experiences questions. I did not include the past experiences questions in the balance checks because their reporting may have been affected by the treatment.

4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the responses to the outcome variables. The indices show the mean number of questions answered for each set of questions. For example, on average, individuals agreed with nearly 1.55 (out of 5) questions about the police behaving abusively. Individuals agree with, on average, 3.67 (out of 5) questions about police being effective, and 1.47 (out of 2) questions about preferring the police to provide security during a crisis. The component variables indicate the percentage of respondents that agreed to the statement (or that preferred the police over non-state and supra-state actors).

Figure 3 and Figure 4 provide the distribution of responses to the two questions about security response preferences. It is clear from the Figures that most people preferred the police to respond to a crisis.

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Outcome Measures

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Prefer Police to Respond to mob violence	0.76	0.43	970
Prefer Police to Respond to hala hala	0.72	0.45	973
Prefer Police (Index)	1.47	0.85	970
Police Steal	0.30	0.84	934
Police Cause Problems	0.17	0.38	971
Police Act Like Criminals	0.32	0.47	886
Police are Corrupt	0.52	0.50	880
Police are Discriminatory	0.28	0.45	949
Abusive (Index)	1.55	1.62	836
No Rogue Will Enter the Community with Police Presence	0.45	0.50	953
Less Crime with Police Presence	0.91	0.29	964
Police Can Catch Criminals	0.77	0.42	953
Feel Safer with Police in the Community	0.80	0.40	972
Police Arrest Me if I Commit a Crime	0.76	0.43	925
Effectiveness (Index)	3.67	1.21	885




Figure 3: If there is a hala hala between two tribes or religions in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation?




Figure 4: If there's a big group of people making noise to fight (mob violence), who would you most like to resolve the situation?

5 BALANCE

Table 3 shows balance on a number of co-variates specified in the pre-analysis plan. The p-values for F v. C compare the female treatment group to the control group and the p-values for the M v. C compare the male treatment group to the control group. As mentioned in the main text, the female treatment group was less likely to be Christian, more likely to own land, and had more people in their households when compared to the control group. The male treatment group was less likely to have traditional leaders compared to the control group, as well as more people in their household compared to the control group.

Table 3: Balance Tables

Variables	Control	Female Visits	Male Visits	p-value (F v. C)	p-value (M v. C)
Age	35.36	35.98	34.4	0.57	0.39
Women	0.50	0.50	0.47	0.84	0.56
Minority Ethnicity	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.52	0.74
Christian	0.99	0.93	0.99	0.001**	0.52
Traditional Leader	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.83	0.007**
Born in Town	0.74	0.80	0.73	0.11	0.85
Own Land	0.41	0.63	0.44	0.00***	0.47
Farm	0.34	0.42	0.41	0.06 [†]	0.10
Head of Household	0.35	0.40	0.35	0.18	0.95
Household Number	6.09	6.85	6.59	0.002**	0.06 [†]
Children	0.91	0.93	0.88	0.55	0.18
Read	0.65	0.57	0.61	0.08 [†]	0.38
Cognitive Ability	0.57	0.59	0.51	0.57	0.22
No Education	0.15	0.20	0.17	0.10	0.51

Note:

[†]p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

6 PREDICTORS OF THE SPILLOVER GROUP

Table 4: Characteristics of the Spillover Group

	(1) Spillover
Female	0.18 (0.35)
Minorities	0.47 (1.03)
Land	0.78 ⁺ (0.46)
Know Someone in Police	-0.34 (0.50)
Age	-0.05* (0.02)
Born in Town	0.76 (0.75)
Household Number	-0.02 (0.08)
Can Read	0.56 (0.42)
No Education	0.67 (0.65)
Farm	-0.19 (0.56)
Crime Victim	-0.89 (0.73)
Constant	-0.79 (1.12)
<i>N</i>	221
<i>BIC</i>	271.8

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4 shows the predictors of the spillover group or of the group that knew about the police visits. The only predictors of the spillover group are age and land ownership. The spillover group was younger and perhaps more likely to own land. This suggests that youth and land owners may have been more likely to find out about the police visits. Their information transmission networks may be stronger than other networks in the community. That is, information about police visits may have travelled faster among youth networks and land owner networks. Interestingly, traditional leadership did not predict membership in the spillover group, nor did being in the minority ethnic group. No non-Christian was a member of the spillover group. Put another way, all those who knew about the visits were Christian, but not all Christians knew about the visits.

7 AES ESTIMATES DISAGGREGATED BY TREATMENT

Table 5 provides the AES estimates disaggregated by each treatment. They confirm that there was no difference in the magnitude of the treatment effect between male and female police officers. Nonetheless, the male treatment group did display more of an effect than the female treatment group when comparing perceptions of effectiveness between the two groups.

Table 5: Average Effect Size

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Police to Respond to Crisis	Perceptions of Abuse	Perceptions of Effectiveness
Male Police Treatment (Compared to Control)	1.40*** (0.17)	-0.60*** (0.11)	0.39*** (0.08)
<i>N</i>	595	594	595
Female Police Treatment (Compared to Control)	1.38*** (0.17)	-0.58*** (0.12)	0.33*** (0.08)
<i>N</i>	596	596	597
Female Police Treatment (Compared to Male Police Treatment)	0.01 (0.09)	0.002 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
<i>N</i>	744	675	681

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Notes: Average Effect Sizes (AES) for each cluster of outcomes.

AES coefficients are interpreted in terms of standard deviations from the control group mean.

8 INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS

In this section, I provide disaggregated analyses of each individual question or each composite variable used to create the indices. Table 6 provides the estimates for preferences for the police. Both male and female police treatments led to an increase in preferences for the police to respond to a hala hala or to mob violence. Table 7 shows that the male and female police treatment led to a decrease in beliefs that the police stealing, causing problems in the community, behaving like criminals, acting corrupt, and acting discriminatory. Table 8 shows that the male and female treatments led to individuals believing that there would be less crime with police presence, that the police can catch criminals, that they feel safer with the police, and that the police would arrest them if they committed a crime.

Table 6: Prefer Police

	(1)	(2)
	Hala Hala	Mob Violence
Male Police Officer Treatment	0.66*** (0.069)	0.57*** (0.08)
Female Police Officer Treatment	0.65*** (0.07)	0.57*** (0.08)
Traditional Leader	-0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Land	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Christian	0.19* (0.08)	0.20* (0.08)
Household Number	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)
Constant	0.06 (0.11)	0.17 (0.10)
<i>N</i>	969	966
<i>R</i> ²	0.38	0.31
<i>BIC</i>	799.3	811.9

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7: Perceptions of Police Abuse

	(1) Steal	(2) Cause Problems	(3) Like Criminal	(4) Corrupt	(5) Discriminate
Male Police Officer Treatment	-0.64*** (0.102)	-0.23*** (0.0605)	-0.37*** (0.08)	-0.15* (0.0643)	-0.48*** (0.0753)
Female Police Officer Treatment	-0.62*** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.08)	-0.19** (0.07)	-0.44*** (0.08)
Traditional Leader	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.11+ (0.06)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Land	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06+ (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Christian	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.05 (0.08)	0.006 (0.08)
Household Number	0.001 (0.005)	0.0003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.0007 (0.007)	-0.02** (0.005)
Constant	0.93*** (0.15)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.72*** (0.12)	0.61*** (0.10)	0.74*** (0.11)
<i>N</i>	930	967	882	877	945
<i>R</i> ²	0.10	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.20
<i>BIC</i>	2268.4	827.6	1088.4	1288.0	1001.9

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 8: Perceptions of Police Effectiveness

	(1) No Rogue	(2) Less Crime	(3) Catch Criminal	(4) Feel Safer	(5) Arrest Me
Male Police Officer Treatment	0.03 (0.08)	0.07** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.11* (0.05)	0.41*** (0.06)
Female Police Officer Treatment	0.03 (0.07)	0.06* (0.03)	0.28** (0.08)	0.10+ (0.05)	0.36*** (0.06)
Traditional Leader	0.003 (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07+ (0.04)	-0.009 (0.06)
Land	-0.008 (0.04)	0.05* (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Christian	0.20** (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.06)
Household Number	-0.006 (0.007)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.005)
Constant	0.28** (0.09)	0.76*** (0.07)	0.42*** (0.11)	0.64*** (0.12)	0.50*** (0.08)
<i>N</i>	949	960	949	968	923
<i>R</i> ²	0.007	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.17
<i>BIC</i>	1409.1	375.2	1021.7	1001.1	938.9

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

8.1 INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS: HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS

Table 9 shows that visits by female officers to local women did not change local women's preferences about choosing the police to respond to a hala hala or mob violence. Table 10 shows that visits by female officers to local women did not change local women's perceptions about police abuse. If anything, there is modest indication that the visits led women to believe that the police cause more problems (Table 10, Model 2). But there is a general lack of consistency across the responses to make a general conclusion about perceptions of police abuse. Additionally, the effect is only weakly statistically significant. Table 11 shows that visits by female officers to local women did not change local women's perceptions of police effectiveness.

Table 12 shows that visits by female officers to local men did not change local men's preferences about choosing the police to respond to a hala hala or mob violence. Table 13 shows that visits by female officers to local men did not change local men's perceptions about the police stealing, behaving like criminals, being corrupt, or discriminatory. The one exception may be that it decreased perceptions of police causing problems in the community. However, there is no consistency among the other indicators, suggesting that visits by female police did not have an overall effect in changing perceptions of police abuse. And again, the effect is only weakly statistically significant. Finally, Table 14 shows that visits by female officers to local men did not change local men's perceptions of police effectiveness. This is important because some literature suggests that men may find the security forces more weak with increased numbers of women in the security forces. I did not find this to be the case.

Table 9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Women x Female Police Treatment (Prefer Police)

	(1)	(2)
	Hala Hala	Mob Violence
Female Police Officer Treatment	-0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Female	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 ⁺ (0.04)
Female Police Officer Treatment x Female	0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Traditional Leader	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)
Land	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Christian	0.18* (0.09)	0.21** (0.08)
Household Number	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)
Constant	0.71*** (0.10)	0.70*** (0.09)
<i>N</i>	747	744
<i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.03
<i>BIC</i>	548.9	457.7

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Women x Female Police Treatment (Abusive)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Steal	Cause Problems	Like Criminal	Corrupt	Discriminate
Female Police Officer Treatment	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)
Female	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)
Female Police Officer Treatment x Female	-0.03 (0.05)	0.09+ (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)
Traditional Leader	0.008 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.15* (0.07)	0.24*** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Land	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.0003 (0.03)
Christian	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.15+ (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)
Household Number	0.003 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.00 (0.009)	-0.01* (0.005)
Constant	0.28* (0.11)	0.27* (0.10)	0.35** (0.11)	0.46*** (0.11)	0.25** (0.08)
<i>N</i>	728	747	700	699	736
<i>R</i> ²	0.012	0.024	0.021	0.025	0.014
<i>BIC</i>	671.5	470.8	830.4	1047.9	707.7

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Women x Female Police Treatment (Effectiveness)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	No Rogue	Less Crime	Catch Criminal	Feel Safer	Arrest Me
Female Police Officer Treatment	0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)
Female	0.06 (0.07)	0.06 (0.03)	0.005 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)
Female Police Officer Treatment x Female	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.002 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
Traditional Leader	-0.09 (0.08)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.10* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)
Land	0.008 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.009 (0.03)
Christian	0.20* (0.0812)	0.08 (0.0623)	0.14+ (0.0748)	0.13 (0.114)	-0.13** (0.0399)
Household Number	-0.02* (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Constant	0.36** (0.11)	0.79*** (0.07)	0.65*** (0.09)	0.74*** (0.12)	0.98*** (0.05)
<i>N</i>	736	744	739	746	702
<i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
<i>BIC</i>	1098.8	176.7	690.3	721.2	586.2

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 12: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Men x Female Police Treatment (Prefer Police)

	(1)	(2)
	Hala Hala	Mob Violence
Female Police Treatment	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.03)
Male	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 ⁺ (0.04)
Female Police Treatment x Male	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Traditional Leader	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)
Land	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Christian	0.18* (0.09)	0.21** (0.08)
Household Number	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)
Constant	0.77*** (0.10)	0.77*** (0.09)
<i>N</i>	747	744
<i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.03
<i>BIC</i>	548.9	457.7

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 13: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Men x Female Police Treatment (Abusive)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Steal	Cause Problem	Like Criminal	Corrupt	Discriminate
Female Police Treatment	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.08 ⁺ (0.04)
Male	0.04 (0.04)	0.09* (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)
Female Police Treatment x Male	0.03 (0.05)	-0.09 ⁺ (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.05)
Traditional Leader	0.008 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.15* (0.07)	0.24*** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Land	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.0003 (0.03)
Christian	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.15 ⁺ (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)
Household Number	0.003 (0.006)	0.008 (0.006)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.00 (0.009)	-0.01* (0.005)
Constant	0.24* (0.11)	0.18 ⁺ (0.10)	0.30** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.10)	0.19* (0.08)
<i>N</i>	728	747	700	699	736
<i>R</i> ²	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
<i>BIC</i>	671.5	470.8	830.4	1047.9	707.7

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 14: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Men x Female Police Treatment (Effective)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	No Rogue	Less Crime	Catch Criminal	Feel Safer	Arrest Me
Female Police Treatment	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.008 (0.04)	0.004 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Male	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
Female Police Treatment x Male	0.05 (0.09)	0.002 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Traditional Leader	-0.09 (0.08)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.10* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.06)
Land	0.008 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.009 (0.03)
Christian	0.20* (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	0.14+ (0.07)	0.13 (0.11)	-0.13** (0.04)
Household Number	-0.02* (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.01)
Constant	0.41*** (0.11)	0.84*** (0.064)	0.65*** (0.09)	0.75*** (0.12)	0.98*** (0.05)
<i>N</i>	736	744	739	746	702
<i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.009	0.008
<i>BIC</i>	1098.8	176.7	690.3	721.2	586.2

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 15: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects: Local Men x Male Police Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Prefer Police	Abusive	Effective
Male Police Treatment	0.007 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.16)	0.07 (0.17)
Male	-0.12 ⁺ (0.06)	0.21 (0.13)	-0.13 (0.09)
Male Police Treatment x Male	-0.01 (0.10)	0.11 (0.19)	0.04 (0.17)
Traditional Leader	-0.03 (0.12)	0.29 (0.19)	0.23 ⁺ (0.14)
Land	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.12)	0.07 (0.10)
Christian	0.39* (0.16)	-0.31 (0.35)	0.35 (0.24)
Household Number	-0.007 (0.01)	0.003 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Constant	1.53*** (0.19)	1.37** (0.42)	3.64*** (0.27)
<i>N</i>	744	675	681
<i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.02	0.01
<i>BIC</i>	1457.1	2331.7	2147.2

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

8.2 ESTIMATES EXCLUDING SPILLOVER GROUP

Because the spillover group biased the results in favor of the treatment, I provide estimates here excluding them from the sample. Table 16 shows that even with the spillover group excluded from the analysis, the female and male police visits led to individuals preferring the police to respond to a hala hala and to mob violence. Table 17 shows that with the spillover group removed, the treatments generally led to improved perceptions of police restraint (decreased perceptions of police abuse). Importantly, however, excluding the treatment group makes the male treatment effect on perceptions of corruption insignificant. Finally, Table 18 shows that excluding the spillover group from the analysis slightly weakens the treatment effect on perceptions of effectiveness.

Table 16: Prefer Police (Excluding Spillover from Analysis)

	(1)	(2)
	Hala Hala	Mob Violence
Male Police Officer Treatment	0.61*** (0.0709)	0.49*** (0.0789)
Female Police Officer Treatment	0.60*** (0.07)	0.49*** (0.08)
Traditional Leader	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Land	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.005 (0.03)
Christian	0.19* (0.08)	0.20** (0.08)
Household Number	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.004)
Constant	0.12 (0.11)	0.25* (0.10)
<i>N</i>	924	921
<i>R</i> ²	0.31	0.23
<i>BIC</i>	783.1	772.2

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 17: Perceptions of Police Abuse (Excluding Spillover from Analysis)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Steal	Cause Problems	Like Criminal	Corrupt	Discriminate
Male Police Officer Treatment	-0.62*** (0.12)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.32*** (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.44*** (0.09)
Female Police Officer Treatment	-0.60*** (0.12)	-0.18** (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.13+ (0.07)	-0.40*** (0.09)
Traditional Leader	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.006 (0.04)	0.12+ (0.07)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Land	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06+ (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.03)
Christian	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.04 (0.08)	0.003 (0.08)
Household Number	0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	0.00 (0.007)	-0.02** (0.005)
Constant	0.90*** (0.16)	0.44*** (0.10)	0.67*** (0.12)	0.53*** (0.10)	0.70*** (0.12)
<i>N</i>	889	922	859	841	900
<i>R</i> ²	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.16
<i>BIC</i>	2203.3	739.4	1062.4	1247.2	948.9

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 18: Perceptions of Police Effectiveness (Excluding Spillover from Analysis)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	No Rogue	Less Crime	Catch Criminal	Feel Safer	Arrest Me
[1em] Male Police Officer Treatment	0.007 (0.09)	0.09** (0.03)	0.19* (0.08)	0.12+ (0.06)	0.42*** (0.08)
Female Police Officer Treatment	0.007 (0.08)	0.08* (0.03)	0.18* (0.08)	0.11+ (0.07)	0.37*** (0.08)
Traditional Leader	-0.004 (0.07)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.02 (0.05)	0.08+ (0.04)	-0.008 (0.06)
Land	-0.006 (0.04)	0.04+ (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Christian	0.20** (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.06)
Household Number	-0.007 (0.007)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)
Constant	0.31** (0.10)	0.75*** (0.07)	0.50*** (0.10)	0.65*** (0.12)	0.49*** (0.08)
<i>N</i>	907	918	908	923	878
<i>R</i> ²	0.007	0.022	0.05	0.02	0.16
<i>BIC</i>	1349.9	358.6	941.0	947.3	865.9

Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

9 2SLS REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF CACE

Another way to account for non-compliance is to provide the complier average causal effect (CACE) estimates. This analysis uses the treatment assignment to predict the treated group in the first stage. These estimates are then used to estimate the second stage—the effects on the outcomes. Table 19 shows that compliers make up 77% of the subject pool. The second stage estimates predict the outcome variables, which is regressed on the actual treatment using the assignment as an instrument. Table 20, Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, and Table 25 show that these estimates produce similar findings as the main paper.

Table 19: First Stage

	(1) Treated
Assigned Treatment	0.77*** (0.02)
Constant	0.20*** (0.02)
N	974
R^2	0.66

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 20: Second Stage (Prefer Police) Individual Questions

	(1)	(2)
	Prefer Police to Respond to Hala Hala	Prefer Police to Respond to Mob Violence
Treated	0.85*** (0.04)	0.74*** (0.04)
Traditional Leadership	0.009 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Own Land	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Christian	0.20** (0.08)	0.20** (0.07)
Household Number	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Constant	-0.13 (0.09)	0.006 (0.09)
N	969	966
R^2	0.09	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 21: Second Stage (Prefer Police) Combined Questions

	(1)
	Prefer Police
Treated	1.60*** (0.08)
Traditional Leader	0.06 (0.10)
Own Land	-0.07 (0.05)
Christian	0.41** (0.14)
Household Number	-0.006 (0.009)
Constant	-0.13 (0.17)
N	966
R^2	0.07

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 22: Second Stage (Perceptions of Police Abuse) Individual Questions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Steal	Cause Problems	Like Criminals	Corrupt	Discriminate
Treated	-0.82*** (0.09)	-0.29*** (0.04)	-0.45*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.61*** (0.05)
Traditional Leader	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.09 (0.06)	0.20** (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)
Own Land	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.007 (0.03)
Christian	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.14* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)
Household Number	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.005)
Constant	1.11*** (0.17)	0.55*** (0.08)	0.78*** (0.10)	0.65*** (0.11)	0.90*** (0.09)
N	930	967	882	877	945
R^2	0.04	0.005	0.05	0.01	0.06

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 23: Second Stage (Perceptions of Police Abuse) Combined Questions

	(1)
	Perceptions of Police Abuse
Treated	-2.39*** (0.17)
Traditional Leader	0.19 (0.21)
Land	-0.14 (0.11)
Christian	-0.40 (0.29)
Household Number	-0.01 (0.02)
Constant	4.03*** (0.34)
N	833
R^2	0.10

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{\dagger}p < 0.10$ $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$

Table 24: Second Stage (Perceptions of Police Effectiveness) Individual Questions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	No Rogue	Feel Safer	Less Crime	Catch Criminal	Arrest Me
Treated	0.04 (0.05)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.50*** (0.04)
Traditional Leader	0.006 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Own Land	-0.009 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.043* (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)
Christian	0.20* (0.09)	0.09 (0.07)	0.07 (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)
Household Number	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.00 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.00 (0.005)
Constant	0.27** (0.10)	0.60*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.09)	0.38*** (0.09)
N	949	968	960	949	923
R^2	0.004	0.008	0.02	.	0.09

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 25: Second Stage (Perceptions of Police Effectiveness) Combined Questions

	(1)
	Perceptions of Police Effectiveness
Treated	1.18*** (0.12)
Traditional Leader	0.31 (0.16)
Own Land	0.12 (0.08)
Christian	0.29 (0.23)
Household Number	0.001 (0.01)
Constant	2.35*** (0.27)
N	883
R^2	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses

† $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

10 MULTIPLE TESTING

One concern about the analyses is that multiple testing could result in Type I error. To correct for this, I provide adjusted p-values for each individual test conducted. In total, between Hypothesis 1 and 2, there are forty-eight possible tests, given that there are two treatments, one control, and twelve possible outcome variables. Table 26 provides the corrected p-values for the tests using the Bonferroni, Hochberg, Holm, Hommel, Benjamini-Hochberg (BH), and Yekutieli (BY) methods. The Bonferroni, Hochberg, Holm, and Hommel limit the probability of even one false positive, whereas the Bh and BY method attempt to control the expected proportion of false positives.

Table 26 breaks down each of the tests. The letters following each outcome variable represent the comparison. For example, “MC” means the male police officer treatment (M) compared to the control (C), “FC” means the female officer treatment (F) compared to the control (C), and “MF” means the male police officer treatment (M) compared to the female police officer treatment (F). The “I” signifies the test for the interaction between the female officer treatment and local women (H2). The names of the outcome variables correspond to the variables in the main text.

Table 26 shows that even when correcting for multiple testing, many of the variables used to test H1 maintain significance. Eight tests become insignificant as a result of the corrections. However, thirteen tests remain significant. These thirteen are tests of H1, which means that there is still support for the hypothesis. However, it is worth noting that H1 is supported when measuring preferences for the police and police abuse. None of the police effectiveness measures remain significant. There continues to be no support for H2. Figure 5 shows the plot of the raw p-values against the adjusted p-values.

Table 26: Adjusted p-Values

Test	Raw p-value	Bonferroni	BH	Holm	Hochberg	Hommel	BY
1	Mob Violence MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	Mob Violence FC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3	Hala Hala MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
4	Hala Hala FC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
5	Steal MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
6	Steal FC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
7	Cause Problem MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
8	Like Criminal MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
9	Like Criminal FC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
10	Discriminate MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
11	Discriminate FC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
12	Arrest Me MC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
13	Arrest Me FC	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
14	Cause Problem FC	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03
15	Catch Criminal MC	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03
16	Catch Criminal FC	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.03	0.03
17	Less Crime MC	0.00	0.14	0.01	0.10	0.10	0.09
18	Corrupt FC	0.00	0.19	0.01	0.12	0.12	0.12
19	Corrupt MC	0.02	0.91	0.05	0.57	0.57	0.53
20	Less Crime FC	0.02	1.00	0.05	0.64	0.64	0.61
21	Feel Safer MC	0.04	1.00	0.09	1.00	0.98	0.98
22	Feel Safer FC	0.06	1.00	0.13	1.00	0.98	0.98
23	Cause Problem I	0.07	1.00	0.14	1.00	0.98	0.98
24	Arrest Me MF	0.09	1.00	0.17	1.00	0.98	0.98
25	Discriminate MF	0.15	1.00	0.29	1.00	0.98	0.98
26	Discriminate I	0.23	1.00	0.42	1.00	0.98	0.98
27	Corrupt MF	0.33	1.00	0.58	1.00	0.98	0.98
28	Like Criminal MF	0.41	1.00	0.69	1.00	0.98	0.98
29	Corrupt I	0.51	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.98	0.98
30	Catch Criminal I	0.54	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.98	0.98
31	Mob Violence MF	0.55	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.98	0.98
32	Steal I	0.55	1.00	0.83	1.00	0.98	0.98
33	Mob Violence I	0.58	1.00	0.84	1.00	0.98	0.98
34	No Rogue I	0.60	1.00	0.85	1.00	0.98	0.98
35	No Rogue FC	0.66	1.00	0.88	1.00	0.98	0.98
36	Less Crime MF	0.67	1.00	0.88	1.00	0.98	0.98
37	No Rogue MC	0.68	1.00	0.88	1.00	0.98	0.98
38	Hala Hala MF	0.73	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
39	Catch Criminal MF	0.75	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
40	Arrest Me I	0.76	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
41	Hala Hala I	0.81	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
42	Cause Problem MF	0.81	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
43	Like Criminal I	0.82	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
44	Feel Safer I	0.83	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.98
45	No Rogue MF	0.94	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.98
46	Less Crime I	0.96	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.98
47	Steal MF	0.97	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.98
48	Feel Safer MF	0.98	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.98




Figure 5: Plot of Adjusted p-values vs. Raw p-values

11 MODELS USING OBSERVATIONAL DATA

In this section I treat the data as observational. In doing so, it is important to note that the analyses are susceptible to the biases associated with the inclusion of post-treatment variables (King and Zeng 2006), mainly because the inclusion of post-treatment variables leads to the comparison groups being dissimilar and unbalanced with respect to every possible confounder (Montgomery, Nyhan and Torres 2018, 6).

Nevertheless, I include models with a range of variables including ones not included in the experimental analysis (due to post-treatment bias) such as whether individuals know police officers (family or friends in the police), whether or not they were a government victim of violence during the war, whether or not they were a victim of crime in the past year, and whether or not the person was suspicious of the survey. These variables could have been affected by the treatment which is why they are not included in the tables in the paper. The models also include the spillover control group. Models 1-5 provide the results from logistic regressions on each of the individual survey questions that measure police abuse, effectiveness and preferences for security. Model 6 in

the tables provide the regression results of a combined index of the questions. Again, Table 27, Table 28, and Table 29 show that the results remain robust to observational tests of the data.

Table 30 provides multinomial logit models for preferences for the police compared to preferences for non-state actors and supra-state actors to respond to a hala hala. It shows that when locals were visited by male or female police officers, they were less likely to choose traditional authority (non-state) actors to provide security during a hala hala. They were also less likely to say ‘I don’t know’ compared to choosing the police if visited by male police officers. Table 31 shows the multinomial logit models for preferences for the police compared to preferences for non-state actors and supra-state actors to respond to a mob justice. Again, both treatments led to a decrease in preferences for traditional authority. However, respondents may have been more likely to prefer UNMIL (supra-state) authority over the police. However, the significance level here is at the 0.10 level, and there may have been too few individuals who responded “UNMIL” to draw valid conclusions. Nevertheless, there is some specific support here to show that the relational contact mechanism helps improve support for state authority over non-state or traditional authority.

Table 27: Observational Data: Individual Questions (Preferences for Police to Respond to Crisis)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Hala Hala	Mob Violence	Combined
Visited by Male Officers	2.74*** (0.46)	2.27*** (0.41)	0.97*** (0.14)
Visited by Female Officers	2.64*** (0.49)	2.49*** (0.45)	0.99*** (0.14)
Knew about Police Visits	-2.75** (0.91)	-3.56*** (0.98)	-0.61*** (0.12)
Female	0.24 (0.23)	0.36 ⁺ (0.21)	0.07 (0.04)
Minority Ethnic Group	-0.38 (0.47)	0.24 (0.46)	0.03 (0.10)
Traditional Leader	-0.60 (0.37)	-0.029 (0.39)	-0.07 (0.09)
Land	-0.43 (0.28)	-0.32 (0.32)	-0.06 (0.06)
Born in Town	0.16 (0.28)	0.08 (0.26)	0.02 (0.05)
Know Someone in Police	1.74*** (0.26)	1.92*** (0.27)	0.39*** (0.05)
Household Number	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 ⁺ (0.04)	-0.01 (0.007)
Christian	0.68 (0.46)	1.06* (0.52)	0.26 ⁺ (0.14)
Farm	0.19 (0.25)	0.23 (0.22)	0.03 (0.04)
Crime Victim	-0.10 (0.35)	0.42 (0.39)	0.05 (0.07)
Experienced Gov. Wartime Violence	-1.08** (0.35)	-1.41*** (0.35)	-0.39*** (0.10)
Suspicious about Survey	2.31*** (0.59)	2.30** (0.77)	0.23*** (0.05)
Others Nearby	0.14 (0.24)	-0.32 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.06)
Constant	-1.96** (0.71)	-1.61* (0.65)	0.39 ⁺ (0.20)
<i>N</i>	968	965	965
<i>R</i> ²			0.471
<i>BIC</i>	796.9	764.1	1918.7

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 28: Observational Data: Individual Questions (Abusive)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Steal	Cause Problems	Like Criminal	Corrupt	Discriminate	Combined
Visited by Male Officers	-2.17*** (0.45)	-0.99* (0.41)	-1.40*** (0.35)	-0.32 (0.30)	-2.58*** (0.43)	-1.69*** (0.34)
Visited by Female Officers	-2.09*** (0.46)	-1.07* (0.46)	-1.69*** (0.38)	-0.45 (0.32)	-2.23*** (0.42)	-1.71*** (0.35)
Knew about Police Visits	1.36* (0.56)	1.06*** (0.26)	2.28*** (0.58)	2.07* (0.83)	0.92* (0.44)	1.52*** (0.33)
Female	-0.23 (0.16)	-0.36 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.18)	-0.10 (0.09)
Minority Ethnic Group	0.81* (0.35)	0.55 (0.46)	0.30 (0.42)	0.06 (0.37)	0.20 (0.39)	0.30 (0.29)
Traditional Leader	0.08 (0.37)	-0.008 (0.36)	0.33 (0.31)	0.96*** (0.27)	0.14 (0.32)	0.27 (0.18)
Land	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.13 (0.20)	0.12 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.12)
Born in Town	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.18 (0.27)	-0.65** (0.24)	-0.53** (0.19)	-0.44 ⁺ (0.25)	-0.35* (0.14)
Know Someone in Police	-0.60*** (0.17)	-1.67*** (0.28)	-0.73*** (0.19)	0.28 (0.19)	0.30 (0.24)	-0.38** (0.13)
Household Number	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.007 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
Christian	-0.12 (0.60)	-0.26 (0.53)	-0.08 (0.56)	0.30 (0.40)	-0.09 (0.60)	-0.04 (0.39)
Farm	0.08 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.21)	0.03 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.20)	0.14 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.13)
Crime Victim	-0.35 (0.37)	-0.13 (0.32)	0.08 (0.29)	-0.35 (0.22)	-1.35*** (0.39)	-0.22 (0.18)
Experienced Gov. Wartime Violence	0.93*** (0.30)	1.01** (0.35)	0.85** (0.33)	0.55 ⁺ (0.31)	0.05 (0.35)	0.75** (0.23)
Suspicious about Survey	-1.17** (0.43)	-2.84** (1.03)	1.37*** (0.25)	0.39* (0.20)	1.48*** (0.22)	0.16 (0.15)
Others Nearby	0.16 (0.18)	0.96*** (0.26)	0.14 (0.19)	-0.42* (0.19)	0.23 (0.26)	0.04 (0.12)
Constant	0.83 (0.73)	-0.43 (0.65)	0.92 (0.66)	0.49 (0.49)	1.48* (0.72)	3.39*** (0.50)
<i>N</i>	929	966	881	876	944	832
<i>R</i> ²						0.31
<i>BIC</i>	956.0	816.2	1039.8	1250.7	988.2	2976.1

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 29: Observational Data: Individual Questions (Effective)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	No Rogue	Feel Safer	Less Crime	Catch Criminal	Arrest Me	Combined
Visited by Male Officers	0.89* (0.40)	0.81* (0.33)	1.31** (0.42)	0.96* (0.39)	3.18*** (0.32)	1.19*** (0.19)
Visited by Female Officers	1.10** (0.40)	0.49 (0.35)	1.32** (0.43)	1.00* (0.40)	2.82*** (0.37)	1.15*** (0.20)
Knew about Police Visits	-0.99* (0.39)	0.88 ⁺ (0.51)	-2.56*** (0.55)	0.03 (0.33)	-0.14 (0.31)	-0.66*** (0.15)
Female	0.12 (0.16)	0.45 ⁺ (0.25)	-0.02 (0.19)	0.06 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.16)	0.06 (0.08)
Minority Ethnic Group	-0.01 (0.35)	-1.41*** (0.38)	-0.05 (0.38)	-0.16 (0.47)	-0.49 (0.42)	-0.19 (0.18)
Traditional Leader	-0.03 (0.36)	0.60 (0.44)	-0.04 (0.39)	0.63* (0.28)	-0.33 (0.40)	0.08 (0.13)
Land	0.05 (0.17)	0.70* (0.29)	0.55* (0.22)	0.06 (0.21)	0.46* (0.20)	0.23** (0.08)
Born in Town	0.04 (0.22)	-0.75* (0.30)	-0.30 (0.23)	-0.25 (0.23)	0.19 (0.25)	-0.10 (0.10)
Know Someone in Police	-0.96*** (0.14)	-0.11 (0.24)	0.41 ⁺ (0.22)	0.50** (0.17)	-0.80*** (0.23)	-0.15 ⁺ (0.08)
Household Number	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Christian	0.84* (0.38)	0.18 (0.64)	0.45 (0.48)	0.25 (0.65)	-0.83 (0.67)	0.10 (0.23)
Farm	0.08 (0.18)	-0.27 (0.26)	0.09 (0.21)	-0.14 (0.21)	0.37 ⁺ (0.20)	0.03 (0.08)
Crime Victim	-0.59** (0.22)	0.30 (0.36)	0.44 ⁺ (0.27)	0.91** (0.32)	1.51*** (0.35)	0.26* (0.11)
Experienced Gov. Wartime Violence	-0.72* (0.33)	-0.48 (0.36)	0.36 (0.33)	-0.99** (0.31)	0.17 (0.45)	-0.31* (0.15)
Suspicious about Survey	0.32 (0.20)	1.04 ⁺ (0.57)	1.94*** (0.50)	1.57** (0.52)	1.69*** (0.49)	0.68*** (0.09)
Others Nearby	-1.41*** (0.27)	0.42 (0.28)	-1.40*** (0.26)	-1.35*** (0.22)	-1.64*** (0.30)	-0.92*** (0.11)
Constant	-0.26 (0.52)	1.52* (0.72)	0.39 (0.62)	1.12 (0.74)	0.88 (0.76)	3.21*** (0.28)
<i>N</i>	948	959	948	967	922	882
<i>R</i> ²						0.259
<i>BIC</i>	1263.5	664.0	965.9	975.9	883.5	2692.8

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

11.1 MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS

Table 30: Preferences for Crisis Response: Hala Hala

	<i>Dependent Variable: Compared to Police</i>		
	UNMIL	Traditional Authority	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male Treatment	0.38 (0.63)	-4.33*** (0.33)	-5.31*** (1.03)
Female Treatment	0.41 (0.63)	-3.86*** (0.30)	-21.18*** (0.00)
Traditional Leader	0.42 (0.45)	0.18 (0.42)	-15.44*** (0.0000)
Christian	-1.31** (0.48)	-0.94 (0.58)	10.16*** (0.23)
Land	-0.18 (0.27)	0.47 ⁺ (0.26)	0.20 (0.47)
Household Number	0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)
Constant	-1.84* (0.80)	1.86** (0.64)	-11.25*** (0.23)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,155.43	1,155.43	1,155.43

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 31: Preferences for Crisis Response: Mob Violence

	<i>Dependent variable: Compared to Police</i>		
	UNMIL	Traditional Authority	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Male Treatment	1.78 ⁺ (1.03)	-3.80*** (0.34)	-4.57*** (0.74)
Female Treatment	1.72 ⁺ (1.03)	-3.54*** (0.32)	-23.08*** (0.00)
Traditional Leader	-0.03 (0.51)	-0.06 (0.42)	-0.92 (0.82)
Christian	-1.51** (0.48)	-1.06 ⁺ (0.63)	10.63*** (0.20)
Land	0.002 (0.29)	0.20 (0.25)	0.03 (0.39)
Household Number	0.10* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
Constant	-3.51** (1.16)	1.42* (0.68)	-11.39*** (0.20)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,143.24	1,143.24	1,143.24

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

11.2 “I DON’T KNOW” ANSWERS

In this section, I assess the determinants of individuals responding “I don’t know” or “I refuse to answer,” as these were dropped from the main text analyses. Table 32 shows the number and proportion of “I don’t know” and “I refuse to answer” responses. Of note, about 10% of respondents answered “I don’t know” to the questions about corruption and “police behave like criminals.” There was one person who refused to answer the “police sometimes steal” question and two people who refused to answer the corruption question. There was one refuse to answer for “less crime,” one for “arrest me,” and two for “feel safer.”

I assess how different co-variables affect the likelihood of responding “I don’t know.” For purposes of this analysis, the “I don’t know answers” are added together to create an index, so that the dependent variable is a measure of a person’s propensity to answer questions with an “I don’t know” response. Because so few people answered “I refuse to answer,” these are left out of the analyses. I also leave out analysis on the preferences for the police questions, as these generated very few “I don’t know” responses.

Table 33 and Table 34 show these results. Table 33 demonstrates that those who were visited by police officers were less likely to respond “I don’t know” to questions about police abuse. Police visits, however, did not have an effect on respondents’ “I don’t know” response if questions were about police effectiveness (Table 34). Women were more likely to respond “I don’t know” if questions were about police abuse, suggesting that they were less sure of their opinions about police abuse. Those who were suspicious of the survey were less likely to state “I don’t know” if the questions were about police effectiveness, but more likely to do so if the questions were about police abuse. Moreover, if respondents knew someone in the police, they were less likely to respond “I don’t know” if questions were about police abuse. Minority ethnic group members were less likely to respond “I don’t know” when questions were about police effectiveness, suggesting that they were more likely to be certain about their opinions about police effectiveness. In general, it appears that if people have interactions with the police or have some relationships with them, they may be more certain that the police are not abusive. This is consistent with the experimental results in the main paper.

Table 32: Distribution of “I Don’t Know Answers”

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Number of Responses
Mob Violence	0.004	0.06	4
Hala Hala	0.001	0.03	1
Steal	0.06	0.73	36
Cause Problems	0.003	0.06	3
Like Criminal	0.09	0.29	88
Corrupt	0.10	0.30	94
Discriminate	0.03	0.16	25
No Rogue	0.02	0.15	21
Catch Criminal	0.02	0.15	21
Less Crime	0.01	0.10	10
Feel Safer	0.002	0.05	2
Arrest Me	0.05	0.22	49

Table 33: “I don’t know” (Abusive)

	(1) Responded “I Don’t Know”
Visited by Male Police	-0.46* (0.20)
Visited by Female Police	-0.47* (0.21)
Knew about Police Visits	0.15 (0.24)
Female	0.12* (0.05)
Minority Ethnic Group	-0.17 (0.14)
Traditional Leader	-0.09 (0.11)
Own Land	0.007 (0.06)
Know Someone in Police	-0.11* (0.04)
Household Number	-0.001 (0.01)
Christian	0.02 (0.12)
Farm	-0.10 ⁺ (0.05)
Crime Victim	0.04 (0.15)
Experienced Gov. Wartime Violence	0.36 (0.36)
Suspicious about Survey	0.41*** (0.07)
Constant	0.57* (0.22)
<i>N</i>	965
<i>R</i> ²	0.07
<i>BIC</i>	2800.0

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 34: “I don’t know” (Effective)

	(1) Responded “I Don’t Know”
Visited by Male Police	-0.02 (0.04)
Visited by Female Police	0.03 (0.04)
Knew about Police Visits	0.12 ⁺ (0.07)
Female	0.02 (0.02)
Minority Ethnic Group	-0.10** (0.03)
Traditional Leader	0.02 (0.04)
Own Land	-0.02 (0.03)
Know Someone in Police	-0.01 (0.02)
Household Number	0.001 (0.003)
Christian	-0.09 (0.07)
Farm	-0.03 (0.02)
Crime Victim	-0.02 (0.03)
Experienced Gov. Wartime Violence	0.002 (0.04)
Suspicious about Survey	-0.07* (0.03)
Constant	0.20* (0.08)
<i>N</i>	969
<i>R</i> ²	0.021
<i>BIC</i>	828.4

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

12 INFORMATION TREATMENT (SEPARATE EXPERIMENT)

In addition to the field experiment in the main text, where households were visited by male or female police officers, I conducted a separate survey experiment in another ten villages (during a different time period than the field experiment). These ten villages were drawn from the same sample of villages from Section 1. They include Allawala, Chenrinken, Norkwia, Filoken, Barclayville, Grandcess, Big Suehn, Beloken, Deneken, and Judeken. The survey experiment included all the same questions as the survey for this paper, and were done by the exact same enumerators as the survey for the experiment. In total, 501 people were surveyed using the same procedure as the experiment (neighborhood selection and random walk). Out of the 501 respondents, 201 were randomly given the same speech that the officers made to the households. This included information about police professionalization, information about laws, etc (see below). The implementation of the information treatment was double-blind in that enumerators did not know if the survey they were implementing at each household contained the speech or not. Balance between the treated and control groups was still mixed. There was imbalance on respondents being traditional leaders and owning land, with those in the control group including more respondents that were traditional leaders and land owners. As such, below, these two variables are included in the models as covariates.

Table 35 shows that the information treatment led to a decrease in preferences for the police to respond to crises and that it decreased perceptions of police effectiveness. Information enhanced perceptions of police restraint, but not to the same degree as the in-person police visits. Whereas the treatment here moved the control mean by 0.28 standard deviations, the pooled police treatment moved the control mean by 0.70 standard deviations. Table 36, Table 37, and Table 38 show the treatment effects by each individual question. In particular, Table 37 shows that much of the leverage for changes in perceptions of police abuse come from the corruption and discrimination questions. This means that information about the police might improve perceptions of corruption and discrimination but not other dimensions of police abuse. The findings demonstrate that albeit information could improve perceptions of police corruption and discrimination, in general, the content of the speech or information about police professionalization does not change preferences or perceptions of effectiveness, and could even have adverse consequences. They suggest that the

relational component of the visits may be more important for attitude change.

Table 35: Information Treatment (Average Effect Size)

	Preference for Police to Respond to Crisis	Perceptions of Abuse	Perceptions of Effectiveness
Information Treatment	-0.41** (0.14)	-0.28** (0.10)	-0.17 ⁺ (0.09)
<i>N</i>	494	304	394

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 36: Information Treatment (Preference for Police to Respond to Crisis)

	(1) Hala Hala	(2) Mob Violence	(3) Combined
Information Treatment	-0.72*** (0.20)	-0.84*** (0.22)	-0.34*** (0.07)
Traditional Leader	0.99** (0.33)	1.10** (0.38)	0.33** (0.10)
Born in Town	0.62* (0.29)	-0.05 (0.33)	0.12 (0.11)
Land	-0.73** (0.24)	-0.71** (0.26)	-0.30*** (0.08)
Farm	0.50* (0.23)	0.00 (0.24)	0.11 (0.08)
Can Read	0.16 (0.20)	-0.19 (0.22)	0.01 (0.07)
Constant	0.40 (0.33)	1.91*** (0.39)	1.52*** (0.12)
<i>N</i>	495	500	494
R^2			0.082
<i>BIC</i>	638.4	577.4	1204.0

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 37: Information Treatment (Perceptions of Abuse)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Steal	Cause Problems	Like Criminal	Corrupt	Discriminate	Combined
Information Treatment	-0.25 (0.24)	0.01 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.82*** (0.23)	-0.44 ⁺ (0.23)	-0.65*** (0.18)
Traditional Leader	0.42 (0.32)	0.51 ⁺ (0.31)	0.37 (0.28)	0.97* (0.41)	0.60* (0.29)	0.83** (0.26)
Born in Town	-0.09 (0.33)	0.27 (0.37)	0.34 (0.34)	-0.55 (0.37)	-0.39 (0.32)	-0.05 (0.25)
Land	0.17 (0.25)	-0.16 (0.27)	-0.11 (0.26)	0.56* (0.26)	1.10*** (0.27)	0.31 (0.19)
Farm	-0.22 (0.25)	0.32 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.25)	0.22 (0.26)	-0.74** (0.25)	0.03 (0.19)
Can Read	0.18 (0.23)	-0.22 (0.24)	0.30 (0.23)	-0.24 (0.24)	-0.06 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.18)
Constant	-0.91* (0.38)	-1.64*** (0.41)	-1.28** (0.39)	1.31** (0.42)	-0.74* (0.37)	1.94*** (0.29)
<i>N</i>	411	469	415	412	452	304
<i>R</i> ²						0.116
<i>BIC</i>	522.5	518.3	532.7	505.4	550.5	1136.5

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 38: Information Treatment (Perceptions of Effectiveness)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	No Rogue	Less Crime	Catch Criminal	Feel Safer	Arrest Me	Combined
Information Treatment	0.10 (0.22)	-0.86** (0.29)	-0.29 (0.37)	-1.18*** (0.26)	0.17 (0.36)	-0.19 ⁺ (0.11)
Traditional Leader	-0.80** (0.26)	-0.59 ⁺ (0.35)	-0.22 (0.47)	0.52 (0.43)	-0.51 (0.42)	-0.30* (0.15)
Born in Town	-0.40 (0.34)	-1.52* (0.74)	-0.30 (0.63)	0.02 (0.38)	0.04 (0.51)	-0.09 (0.15)
Land	-0.78** (0.25)	-0.79* (0.36)	-1.00* (0.47)	-0.26 (0.31)	0.02 (0.40)	-0.25* (0.12)
Farm	0.22 (0.23)	0.30 (0.32)	0.43 (0.39)	0.20 (0.29)	-0.74 ⁺ (0.42)	0.08 (0.11)
Can Read	-0.26 (0.21)	0.39 (0.29)	0.46 (0.37)	-0.25 (0.26)	-1.05** (0.38)	-0.18 ⁺ (0.10)
Constant	1.88*** (0.39)	3.98*** (0.79)	3.05*** (0.72)	2.39*** (0.46)	3.53*** (0.63)	4.74*** (0.18)
<i>N</i>	490	475	424	501	481	394
<i>R</i> ²						0.04
<i>BIC</i>	602.7	387.8	273.9	447.8	299.1	1154.7

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

13 LNP SCRIPT

Good day, you can invite other people inside the home to listen to me if you want to. I am here to talk to all people in the community.

My name is XXX I work with the Liberia National Police XX years and I have worked in the following sections namely:

I have met with the village elders and they have approved me to speak with you about the LNP. It is entirely your choice whether you want to speak to me or not. You are not in trouble. I am going around talking to many different people about accessing the LNP and some questions about the community. You can ask me any questions you could like about the LNP. This visit will take about 20 minutes to complete. There is no risk in talking to me. I have the permission of the LNP headquarters to visit the community and also the village elder. Your privacy is very important to us. We are not recording your name or anything, but will just take some notes about what you say. All your answers are anonymous. They will never be traced back to you. The notes we take may be used in a report that will be presented in different different places. You have the right to stop talking to me at any time. You may refuse to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer.

Do you have any questions about anything I just said? Were there any parts that seemed unclear?

Can you tell me a little bit about your household?

I was born in Grand Kru in XXXX and my parents also came from here. I have come along to let you know about the work we are coming to do. We all know that the civil war damaged plenty things in Liberia including our security area. So, because of the too much violence and crimes happening in our community, we are fixing our security problems so that all of us can live in peace together and have respect for human rights and the rule of law in our country. We have not come to arrest anyone. Is that clear?

I am here to talk to you about how we can all live together in peace, how you can see us as your friends, brother, sister, security and partner because I am part of the LNP and our work is to protect you, your properties and to make sure the whole county is safe so that no one can come from anywhere to harm you. Is that clear?

I know that this place is peaceful and that is why you don't see plenty police here. But, the LNP wants you people to work along with us. We know you are peaceful, but there are some people here that are can do small small bad bad things, I wrong?

The police are supposed to catch the bad people. So, we want you people to help us report crimes and violence. Such as rape, killing, armed robbery, fighting with knives, cutlasses, taking in drugs, stabbing. We also want to advise you to stop mob violence. When plenty people come to do something, they just can't jump on the person. If you caught a bad criminal or somebody for doing bad things, please do not beat them, just arrest the person and turn the person over to the police. I also beg you, we should not beat on your woman if she does any bad thing please talk with her and make her to know that what she is doing is not good or tell the old people about it or any family member or else one day you will harm or kill her and then you will have to face the law. Rape is a serious crime and it is not good because it can damage the person or even kill the person. Once you have sex with someone below 18, the law says it is wrong. Also, sassywood is against the law. If these things are happening in your community, please report it. We all have to respect each other and respect the law in our country.

So, if you are walking around and you see or hear about these bad things, please call us and report the case. Please call us on this number XXXXXXXXXX. This is the number of the LNP. We will come as soon as we can, right away to put the situation under control or settle the problem. You hear? We would like for you people to please cooperate with us. So that we can live in peace in our community.

We have not forgotten about this County to send enough police officers because we are not many but as soon as we have more police officers, as soon as they graduate from the Police Academy, we will send some of them here.

The Liberian National Police are now professional. Before and during the war, we did not have much training. But, now we have been trained by the UN peacekeepers and officers from America. The LNP are trained to protect you and your properties. Some of our police officers are high school graduates, university graduates, and some even have masters degree. To avoid tribalism or one tribe to be plenty in the LNP, the LNP got people from all the tribes, we got in our country. Also, there are plenty more women in the LNP now. Soon, one out of every three LNP officers will be women. We also do not recruit bad bad people into the LNP. If someone committed a crime

during the war, they are not allowed to work for the LNP. So, the police are a more professional institution than before.

I want you to please encourage your children to join the Police because when they graduate, they will come back and serve you.

So, everything we say, you understand it good good, and you have any question to ask? Any question at all? Please ask us so we can all talk about it and any other question you have about the LNP.

Now, since I am here I want to ask you some small small questions. I am not here to arrest anyone, just to get some information. I am not recording their names or anything about them. They will not know your name. No one will know your name because we are not recording it anywhere. But, if you want, I will take this information to the nearest depot and have another police officer come here to actually take the case.

Have there been any problems in the community in the last six months that you would like to report? Did they report anything (problems)?

Would you be willing to tell me who committed the crime? Did they tell you?

Would you be willing to tell me of any other known rogues in the community? Did they give the specific name of the rogue?

Have you witnessed beating among your neighbors in the last six months? Did they tell you?

Do you know of any rape cases in the community in the last six months? Did they tell you? What is the location in your community that has the most criminal activity? Did they tell you? Have you met any other police officers in the past week (not including today)? How many live in the household?

Thanks for your time and cooperation.

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